By Robert Windrem, NBC News Producer
U.S. officials are downplaying reports in the New York Times and Washington Post that Pakistan's A.Q. Khan may have given Iran--and other nations--blueprints for a miniature nuclear warhead first developed for his country's program.
The reports were based on a study by the Institute for Science and International Security. In its study, David Albright, a former inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency, states that a Swiss family accused of working with Khan had the designs on their computers."Why did these smugglers associated with the notorious Pakistani nuclear engineer A. Q. Khan have these designs, unless they had sold or intended to sell them for Khan?" Albright asked.
No U.S. officials are suggesting the proliferation of nuclear weapons design data is a minor issue or that there is no evidence of Iranian interest in missiles as a delivery vehicle. The issue, they say, is whether this particular design, ideal for small missile warheads, actually found its way to Iran.
Publicly, U.S. officials have been low key in discussing the reports, surprising in that the Bush administration has been pressing Iran to stop its uranium enrichment program.
Stephen Hadley, the president's national security advisor, refused to talk about the possibility on the President's European trip, other than to state: "We're very concerned about the A.Q. Khan network." Khan is the father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and also ran a profitable network that offered or actually dealt uranium enrichment technology to several other states, including North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya.
A spokesman for the CIA declined all comment.
A senior U.S. official familiar with the network's operation explained why the U.S. is downplaying the reports, at least publicly.
"You'll have a hard time proving or disproving this," he said, referring to the possibility that Iran was given the blueprints. "We don't know that this transfer took place."
He and others noted that while the proliferation of weapons design technology is indeed troubling, "bomb design is the least challenging part of the weapons development process. Acquiring fissile material--the enriched uranium or plutonium--is the long pole in the tent, the most challenging part." Khan, he noted, was responsible for uranium-enrichment efforts, while the bomb design was part of another section of the Pakistani nuclear program.
Moreover, the official said it is "not clear how much detail" the blueprints contained and that having the blueprints does not mean one can make a warhead. Making a bomb is simple, 60-year-old technology, but making one capable of being dropped from a fighter bomber or delivered by long-range missile is another issue, requiring systems integration capability, quality control engineering and experienced engineers working with complicated equipment.
In the past, intelligence officials noted that the Iranian nuclear program has experienced "significant engineering problems in the enrichment of uranium", suggesting Iran does not yet have the requisite engineering capability.
Beyond that, there is evidence that Iran has been working on a far less sophisticated delivery system, raising the question of why the Iranians would devote time and effort to that system when they had access to the Pakistani program.
"There is a conflict," Albright admitted to NBC News.
None of this means the Iranians aren't trying to build a nuclear weapon. IAEA documents show that the agency recently confronted Iran with documentation, including "multi-media files", reportedly showing Iranian engineers dealing with missile developments that could only relate to the development of nuclear warheads.
According to ISIS, the information provided by "IAEA member states" included material on the other, less-sophisticated design. Specifically, the documentation referred to "missile re-entry vehicle research including the chronology of events, separation of the missile, loss-of-tracking, switching on of altitude detectors, timing of firing devices, leading to an explosion at an altitude of about 600 meters." The IAEA notes that the altitude described in the documents excludes the possibility that the warhead was designed to accommodate conventional explosives.
Iranian officials have claimed those materials are "forgeries." They have not commented on the latest news reports.
